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ment itself, and the order denying the original motion to 
vacate would therefore come within the exception to the rule 
which precludes an appeal from an order refusing to vacate 
where it serves to allow two appeals. 
For these reasons, I believe the order granting the second 
motion should be reversed. 
[8. F,. No. 16479. In Bank.-January 6, 1941.] 
A. CAMINETTI, Jr., as Insurance Commissioner, etc., Peti-
tioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND 
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent. 
[1] INSURANCE-oINSUlUNCE CORPORATIONS-ORGANIZATION AND REGULA-
TION~INSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION-CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEED-
INGS-STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION.-Seetions 1011, 1012 and 1040 of 
the Insuranee Code, relating to eonservatorship of insuranee eom-
panies and authorizing the removal of the prineipal offiee to San 
Franeiseo or Los Angeles, must be eonstrued together. 
[2] ID.-INSURANCE CORPORATIONS-ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION-
INSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION-CONSERVATORSHIP PaoCEEDINGS- :'! 
REMOVAL OF COMPANY OFl'ICE-oTRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS FOLLOW-
ING REMovAL.-In seetion 1040 of the Insuranee Code deelaring that 
in the event of the removal by a eonservator of the prineipal offiee 
of an insuranee eompany to San Franeiseo or Los Angeles the eourt 
wherein the proeeeding was eommenced "shall" upon appIieation 
direct the clerk to transmit the papers, ete., to such eity or <lity and 
county, the word "shall" is mandatory. 
[8] ID. - I~SURANCJr: CORPORATIONa--:oRGANlZATION AND, REGULATION-
INSOLVlI:NOYAND DISSOLUTION -,- CONSERVATORSHIP PaoCEEDINGS-
PURPOSE OF PROCEEDINGs.-The purpose of a' eonservatorship pro-
eeeding respeeting an insuranee eompany is not the liquidation 
of the eompany, but the eonservation of its assets and business over 
the period of stress by the eommissioner who thereafter yields eon-
trol and direetion to the company's regular offieers. 
[4] ID.-INSURANCE CORPORATIONS -' ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION-
INSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION - CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEEDINGS-
REMOVAL OJ' COMPANY OJ'FICE-oACTS CoNTEMPLATED.-The removal 
by a. e~nservator of the principal offiee of an insurance, eompany 
to Los Angeles or San Franeiseo, as authorized by Insuranee Code, 
3. See ',14 Cal. Jur. 660. 
·lIrlcX. Dig. References: 1-8. Insuranee, § 11; 9. Prohibition, § 59 .(4). 
1 
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seetion 1040, lies in the diseretion of the eonservator. The statute 
does not eon template a eomplete removal of books, assets and busi-
ness; any offieial aet or statement of the eonservator indieative 
of the removal, sueh as the removal of minute books of the eompany . 
pursuant to his previous written deelaration of removal, suffiees. 
[5] lD. - INSURANCE CORPORATIONS-ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION-
INSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION - CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEEDINGS-
ORDER VESTING TITLE-DURATION-"SAID COURT".-In seetion 1012 
of the Insuranee Code, providing that the order vesting title of 
assets of an insuranee eompany shall eontinue in force until it 
appears to "said eourt" that the ground therefor does not exist or 
has been removed, the words "said court" refer to the eourt in 
whieh the proceeding had its inception, unless there has been a 
removal or transfer as eontemplated in section 1040, in whieh case 
they refer to the eourt of transfer. 
[6] lD. - INSURANCE CORPORATIONS-ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION-
INSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION - CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEEDINGS-
REMOVAL OF COMPANY OFl'ICE-oDUE PROCEss.-The removal of the 
principal offiee of an insurance eompany to San Franciseo or Los 
Angeles, on application of the Insu:ranee Commissioner without a 
prior hearing, does not deny due proeess of law, that being afforded 
by the hearing authorized in seetion 1012 of that Code. 
[7] ID. - INSURANCE CORPORATIONS-ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION-
INSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION - CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEEDINGS-
REMOVAL OF COMPANY OFFICE-oREMOVALFROM SAN FRANCISCO OR 
Los ANGELEs.-Under Insurance Code, seetion 1040, authorizing the 
removal of the principal offiee of an insurance company by a con-
servator to San Francisco or Los Angeles, there may be a removal 
from San Franciseo, where the Insurance Commissioner maintains 
an 'office, to Los Angeles. 
[8] In. - INSURANCE CORPORATIONs-ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION':'" 
INSOLVENCY AND DISSOLUTION - CONSERVATORSHIP PROOEEDINGS-
REMOVAL OF COMPANY OFFICE-oTRANSFEB OF PROCEEDINGS FOLLOW-
ING REMOVAL--TIMB FOR TRANSFER.-Under Insurance Code, sec-
tion 1040, the conservator of an insuranee company may "at any 
time" after his appointment and subsequent removal of the prinei-
pal office of the company apply for a transfer of the proceedings, 
whieh the court must grant. 
[9] PROHIBITION - JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE - DETERMINATION -
SCOPE OF RELIEF--GRANT OF WRIT OF MANDATE.-In an original pro-
eeeding in prohibition, the Supreme Court has authority to grant 
any appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings. 
Aeeordingly, in a proceeding to restrain further action in a con· 
servatorship' proceeding under Insurance Code, section 1011, after a 
9. See 21 Cal. Jur. 634; 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 567; 22 R. C. L; 8. 
,-,' 
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removal of the pri:p.cipal' office of the company, as authorized by 
section'1040, the ,court may also order the issuance of a writ of man· 
date !lo=anding the eourt to transfer the proceeding to the suo 
perior eourt of the eounty to which the principal office was removed. 
PROCE'EDINGin ,Prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from proceed· 
ing with the hearing and determination of a cause now pend-
ing before it; Writ granted. 
Earl Warren, Attorney-General, W. T. Sweigert, Assistant 
.A.ttorney~General, and Neil Cunningham, John L. Nourse and 
James A. Arnerich, Deputies Attorney-General, for Peti-
tioner. 
John H. Riordan and Knight, Boland and Riordan for Re-
spondent. 
THE COURT.-In this original proceeding in prohibition 
the petitioner, as Insurance Commissioner of the state, seeks 
to restrain the respondent Superior Court in and for the 
City and County of San Francisco from proceeding with the 
hearing and determination of a cause now pending before it. 
An alternative writ of prohibition was issued by this court 
upon a petition alleging that on August 15, 1940, the peti-
tioner, as Insurance Commissioner, caused to be filed with the 
respondent Superior Court, pursuant to section 1011 of the 
Insurance Code, an application for order appointing him con-
servator of the Mount :Moriah Life Insurance Company, a 
California corporation having its principal office and place 
of business in San FraI;lcisco ; that on the same day, and pursu-
ant to stich request, the respondent court made its order ap-
pointing petitioner conservator, vesting in him as such title 
to all of the assets of the 'company and directing him to take 
possession of its books, records and property with a view to 
conducting the business until the further order of the court, 
to the exclusion of the officers and agents of the company, 
who were thus precluded from interfering with his activities 
as conservator; that thereupon petitioner immediately took 
possession' of the company's assets and records as conserv,ator 
and on the same day removed the principal office of the com-
pany to the city 'of Los Angeles, under the provisions of 
section 1040 of the Insurance Code; that on the following 
~ 
-- - -- - -- --------------~~~~- ~.-- . 
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day, petitioner made application, under that section, for an 
order transferring the conservatorship proceeding to the Su-
perior Court in and for Los Angeles County; that respondent 
Superior Court refused to make such order of transfer but 
instead, and, upon the application of the company, purported 
to restrain petitioner from removing the principal office of 
the company from San Francisco to Los Angeles; that re-
spondent thereupon purported to assume jurisdiction and to 
proceed with the hearing of the company's petition, under 
seCtion 1012 of the Insurance Code, to terminate the con-
servatorship proceeding even though it is without jurisdiction 
other than to transfer the conservatorship proceeding to Los 
Angeles County. ' 
In defense of its action, the respondent court sets forth in 
its return and brief in support thereof the contention that it 
cannot lawfully transfer the conservatorship proceeding to 
Los Angeles or refrain from hearing the application to termi-
nate the same. The validity of this defense depends upon the 
proper interpretation of several sections of the Insurance 
Code. 
Section 1011 provides that "The Superior Court of the 
county in which is located the principal office of such person 
[includes corporation, sec. 19] in this State shall, upon the 
filing by the commissioner of the verified application showing 
any of the following conditions hereinafter enumerated to 
exist, issue its order vesting title to all of the assets of such 
[corporation], wheresoever situated, in the commissioner ... 
and direct the commissioner forthwith to take possession of 
all its books, records, property, real and personal, and assets, 
and to conduct, as conservator, the business of said [corpora~ 
tion], or so much thereof as to the commissioner may seem 
appropriate, and enjoining said [corporation] and its officers, 
. . . from the transaetion of its business or, disposition of its 
property un til the further order of s;lid court: . . . [then 
follow ten enumerated grounds warranting an order of con-
servatorship] . " 
Section 1012 provides that "Said order shall continue in 
force and effect until, on the application either of the commis-
sioner or of such, [corporation], it shall, aftElr a full hearing, 
appear to said court that the ground for said order directing 
the commissioner to take title and possession does not exist 
or has been removed and that said [corporation] can properly 
'/ 
• 
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resume title and possession of its property and the conduct 
of its business". 
Section 1040 provides that" At any time after an order 
is made under sections 1011 [conservatorship] or 1016 [liqui-
dation], the commissioner may remove the principal office 
of the [corporation] proceeded against to the city and county 
of San Francisco or to the city of Los Angeles. . In event of 
such removal, the court wherein the proceeding was com-
menced shall, upon the application of the commissioner, direct 
its clerk to traru;mit all of the papers filed therein with such 
clerk to the clerk of the City and County of San Francisco 
or of the county of Los Angeles as the case may require. The 
proceeding shall thereafter be conducted in the same manner 
as though it had been commenced in the county to which it 
had been transferred." 
, [1] The issues in this case reduce themselves to one of 
statutory construction. In enacting the Insurance Code the 
legislature eXercised its power to regulate a business peculidrly 
charged withil public interest. (Oarpenter v. Pacific Mutual 
L. Ins. 00., 10 Cal. (2d) 307, 329 [74 Pac. (2d) 761] ; German 
Alliance Ins. 00. v. Hale, 219 U. S. 307, 316 [31 Sup. Ct. 
246, 55 L. Ed. '229] ; In re Bean, 207 App. Div. 276 [201· N. Y. :'! 
Supp. 827; 828].) In this light the several sections inques-
tion must be considered together and not as unrelatedprovi-
sions.' , 
[2] The respondent court urges th~t the cOnimis~ioner, as 
conservator, having invoked section 1040, must conform 
thereto in every particular; That section state~that the com-
missioner, .once he is appointed conserv'ator, ,iIIlay.remove the 
principal offi,ce" of the company proceeded against to San 
Francisco or Los Angeles, in which event the court where the 
proceeding was: begun "shall ". up'onapplication of the c~n­
servator order a transfer of the proceeding a:nd papers to the 
city chosen.: Section 16 of the InsurailCe Code declares that 
as, used therein the word" shall" is mandatory unless other-
wise apparent from thc context.. There is nothing in the 
context of section' 1040 to indicate that the word "shall" 
therein is other than niandat~ry. Upon removal of the princi-
pal office of the~eompany to either city, the court wherein the 
proceeding was commenced must accordingly transfer the pro-
ceeding upon application therefor. 
Jan. 1941.] CAMINETTI V. SUPERIOR COURT. 843 
[3, 4] In the view of the respondent court the section 
"clearly contemplates ... an actual or substantial removal 
of the principal office of the insurer proceeded against; ... 
the word 'remove' in connection with the principal office of an 
insurance company contemplates the moving or removing of 
substantially all the physical things and equipment, especially 
the business records of the company and also the business 
activities theretofore conducted thereat". Whatever the 
meamng of the word "remove" in other situations, such a 
construction falls wide of the legislative intent with respect 
to conservatorship proceedings. Not only does it confuse the 
phrase "principal office" with that of "principal place of 
business", between which there is often a clear distinction 
(Watters v. Hamilton Gas 00., 10 Fed. Supp. 323, 326; Peters 
v. Detroit & C. Nav. Co., 24 Fed. (2d) 454, 455; Wicecarver 
v. Mercantt'le T. M . .Ins. 00., 137 Mo. App. 247 [117 S. W. 
698, 700] ; Mason & Hanger 00. v. Sharon, 231 Fed. 861, 863 
[146 C. C. A. 57] ; Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, secs. 
4373 and 4651) but it runs counter to the very purpose of a 
conservatorship proceeding. Such a proceeding contem-
plates, not the liquidation of the company involved, but a 
conservation of the assets and business of the company over 
the period of stress by the commissioner who thereafter yields 
the control and direction to the regular officers of the com-
pany. It is difficult to believe that the legislature intended 
that for the duration of a temporary control by' the com-
missioner there should be a complete removal of books, 
assets and business which would tend to dissipate and ruin 
the business of a company subjected thereto. The principal 
purpose underlying the provision for removal of the principal 
office of the involved insurer either to San Francisco or Los 
Angeles and the consequent removal of the conservatorship 
proceeding thereto, is unquestionably the convenience of the 
commiSsioner who, as such, maintains an office and staff in 
both cities. Venue statutes enacted for the convenience and 
assistance of public officials in the di.scharge of their duties 
are notunusua:l. (State of Oal. v. Superior Oourt, 14 Cal. 
App. (2d) 718, 721 [58 Pac. (2d) 1322]; 67 C. J. 77, sec. 
122.) The matter rests with the legislature and not with 
the courts. Under the unqualified language of section 1040 
the removal of the principal office of an insurance company 
to the places designated 'lies in the discretion of the cOn-
'" 
.. 
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servator and in 'our opinion, any official act or statement of 
his indicativ~ of such removal is adequate. It appears in the 
present case that the conservator removed the Minute Books 
of the comp~ny to Los Angeles in effective compliance with 
his prior written declaration of removal of the "principal 
office" of the Mount Moriah Life Insurance Company from 
San Francisco to Los Angeles. By affidavit it appears that 
the transfer of other books and records of the company was 
iIp.possible because of the auditing thereof by Examiners. 
Then, too, the restraining order issued by the respondent court 
intervened. Given the purpose of the statute,' there is a suffi-
cient showing of removal of the principal office within the 
legislative meaning to require the respondent court to transfer 
the conservatorship proceeding under the mandatory language 
of the statute. 
The rehabilitation sections of our Insurance Code trace 
their origin to the New York statute whose history is perti-
nent. That statute originally provided that after commence-
ment ofa rehabilitation or conservatorship proceeding in the 
judicial district in which the involved company had its" prin-
cipal office'" (sec. 408), the superintendent of insurance "may 
remove the principal office of the insurer to the county of 
Albany" 'in the event of which removal "the court shall upon 
the application of the superintendent, direct the clerk of 
the county wherein such proceeding was commenced, to trans-
mit all of the papers filed therein with such clerk to the clerk 
of the county of Albany and the proceeding shall thereafter 
be conducted in the same manner as though it had been com-
menced in the county of Albany". (Chap. 30, sec. 412, Ca-
hill's, Consol. Laws of New York, 1931-1935.) For all 
practical purposes, this provision and section 1040 here in 
issue are alike. As thereafter amended, howeve'r, the New 
Yark statute declared that "Any time after the commence-
ment of a proceeding . . . the superintendent may apply 
ex parte to the court ... for an order changing the venue 
of,and removing the proceeding to Albany county, or, in the 
discretion of the superintendent, to any other county of this 
state in which he deems that such proceeding may be most 
economically and efficiently conducted. Upon the filing of 
,any such application for removal, the court . . . shall direct 
tj:J.e clerk of the county wherein such proceeding is then pend-
jn~ to tra~~it all of the papers filed ther{li:u. with such clerk 
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to the clerk of the county to which such proceeding is removed) 
and the proceeding shall thereafter be conducted in such other 
county as though it had been commenced in such county." 
(Art. 16, sec. 530, Cahill's Consol. Laws of New York, 1939 
and 1940 Supps.) (Italics added.) 
This transition of the parent statute from one contemplat-
ing the removal of the "principal office" of the insurer to 
Albany County followed by a transfer of the proceeding to 
that county, to one permitting the transfer of the proceeding 
to any county "in the discretion of the superintendent" 
(without any necessity for the prior removal thereto of the 
principal office of the company involved) strengthens the 
belief that the transfer of such a rehabilitation proceeding is 
intended to facilitate the work of the conservator. The com-
plete removal of the principal office and business of the com-
pany to another city might not only handicap his work, but 
frustrate the whole purpose of the rehabilitation proceeding. 
[5] The respondent court also urges that before a removal 
and transfer may be effected the hearing contemplated by 
section 1012, to determine whether "the ground for said order 
directing the commissioner to take title and possession does not 
exist or has been removed", must occur in the county wherein 
the proceeding was commenced and the conservator appointed. 
This point is grounded principally upon the language "said 
court" appearing in section 1012. Such a construction would 
actually serve to nullify the provision in section 1040 which 
declares that after removal of the principal office to either 
county and the consequent transfer of the cause thereto, "The 
proceeding shall thereafter be conducted in the same manner 
as though it had been commenced in the county to which it 
had been transferred". When the relevant sections of the 
Code are read in relation to one another, it is clear that the 
phrase "said court" in section 1012 refers to the court in 
which the proceeding was commenced only when there is no 
removal or transfer as contemplated in section 1040. Other-
wise it applies to the court of transfer which under the posi-
tive language of section 1040 shall then conduct" the proceed-
ing . . . in the same manner as though it had been 
commenced in the county to which it had been transferred", 
Any other construction would violate the plain language and 
intention of the legislature. Moreover, to restrict under all 
circumstances the meaning of the words "said court" ap-
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pearing in section 1012 so as to confin~ the hearing ~rovided 
for in that· section to the court wherem the proceeding had 
its inception would be to nullify in many instances the right 
, " t of the conservator under section 1040 to remove a any 
time" after his appointment the insurer's principal office and 
then to apply for a transfer of the proceeding to one of the 
two places designated in the latter section. [6] The statute 
requires only that the commissioner, as conservator, make 
application to the court for an order directing the clerk. to 
transfer the proceeding. Such action is purely procedural 
and has no bearing on due process. Due process is afforded 
by the hearing authorized in section 1012, which can as well 
be had in the Superior Court to which the proceeding is trans-
ferred. 
[7J The respondent court contends further that the re-
moval provision of section 1040 was intended to permit re-
moval of the principal office of a company and transfer of a 
rehabilitation proceeding "to" but not "from" San Fran-
cisco. In brief, it urges that such transfer may be made from 
any county to either San Francisco or Los Angeles, the places 
designated in the statute, but that such transfer may not be 
made from one of said designated places to the other. This 
contention, .. far from being borne out by the history of the 
statute, seems actually to be precluded thereby. 
The Liquidation Act, as originally enacted (Stats.· 1919, 
p. 268) provided in section 12 that at any time after com-
mencement of a proceeding thereunder the commissioner 
might remove the principal office of the company involved" to 
the city and county of San Francisco". At that time, the 
only office maintained by the commissioner was located in 
San Francisco by virtue of statutory requirement. (Sec. 592, 
Pol. Code.) Th~s section was amended in ·1927 by adding 
thereto "and. shall also. keep an office in the City of Sacra-
mento". In 1935 it .was codified and became section 12905 
of the Insurance Code, at which time there was added thereto 
"and an office in the City of Los Angeles". In conformity 
with such amendment, the legislature amended the 1919 Liqui-
dation Act and incorporated it in the Insurance Code as 
section 1040. Since 1935, therefore, the section has required 
the commissioner to maintain offices in San Francisco, Sacra-
mento and Los Angeles. When the several sections of the 
Insurance Code are read as a whole, it is clear that they pro-
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vide that while a conservatorship proceeding must be com-
menced in the county wherein the insurer has its principal 
office (sec. 1011), the conservator may remove at any time 
after his appointment such principal office "to the City and 
County of San Francisco or to the City of Los Angeles" 
and that the court "shall", upon application, then order the 
proceeding transferred to San Francisco or Los Angeles as 
the case may be (sec. 1040, supra). This provision is clear 
and unqualified. The absence of any qualifying phrase com-
pels the construction that regardless of where the proceeding 
is commenced it lies within the discretion of the commissioner, 
as conservator, to remove the principal office of the insurer 
to either of the two cities designated in the statute and to 
petition the court for a transfer of the proceeding to conform 
thereto. It appears in the 'COmmissioner's brief "that the 
main office of the Bureau of Liquidation has been located 
. . . in the City of Los Angeles for a number of years and 
that the said H. A. Benjamin is in charge thereof with a 
trained staff of personnel experienced and qualified in the 
handling of all matters appertaining to insurance companies 
taken over under conservatorship or placed in liquidation; 
that it is the [Commissioner'S] judgment that the conserva-
torship in all said proceedings can best be handled in the office 
of the Bureau of Liqt'.idations ... in the City of Los An-
geles." The inconvenience to a San Francisco or Los An-
geles company which may result from a transfer of the pro-
ceeding to the other county can be no greater than that to a 
company in the northernmoBt county of the state resulting 
from the transfer to Los Angeles County of a like proceeding 
or the inconvenience to a company in the southernmost county 
of the state resulting from a transfer to San Francisco. No-
where in the statute do we find a qualifying phrase to the 
effect that all proceedings commenced in the northern part 
of the state can be transferred· only to San Francisco while 
those arising in the southern part of the state can be trans-
ferred only to Los Angeles. Likewise there is no qualifying 
phrase that proceedings commenced either in San Francisco 
or Los Angeles may not be transferred to the other. 
Throughout the proceeding in the respondent court the 
commissioner repeatedly sought to establish a lack of juris-
diction in the respondent court to proceed after his removal 
of the principal office of the insurer and his application 
r 
,", 
:'.'. 
,"" 
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for a transfer of the proceeding to comply therewith. At 
no time did he waive the right to claim a lack of jurisdiction 
in the court. [8] In any event he has the right "at any 
time" after his appointment as conservator and subsequent 
removal of the principal. office of the company to apply for a 
transfer of the proceeding, which the court must grant. 
[9] While the conservator has requested only prohibition 
to stay further proceedings in the respondent court, this court 
has authority to grant any appropriate relief within the issues 
presented by the pleadings. (Board of Trustees v. State Bd. 
of Education, 1 Cal. (2d) 784, 787 [37 Pac. (2d) 84, 96 
A. L. R. 775] ; 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-Year Supp. 567, sec. 29.) The 
respondent· court is therefore required not only to refrain 
from further action in the conservatorship proceeding but 
to transfer that proceeding to Los Angeles County in con-
formity with the conservator's removal of the principal office 
of the insurer and in pursuance of his application for such 
transfer, as authorized by the statutes in question. 
In determining this matter we have had access to and have 
considered the briefs filed by the respondents in three com-; 
panion cases. Nothing in those briefs requires a contrary . 
conclusion herein. 
Let peremptory writs of prohibition' and mandate issue 
respectively restraining the respondent Superior Court from 
taking any further steps or proceedings in the conservator-
ship proceeding, now pending in that court, and directing 
that court to transfer the proceeding to the Superior Court 
of the State of California in and for the County of Los 
Angeles. 
Gibson, C. J., did not participate in the decision. 
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.-I cannot agree that the In-
surance Code allows the commissioner, immediately upon his 
appointment as conservator of a company having its prin-
cipal office in San Francisco, to remove that office to Los 
Angeles. Undoubtedly the purpose of section 1040 is to 
facilitate the work of the commissioner. But as he maintains 
an office in San Francisco, removal of the insurance company's 
office to Los Angeles appears to be a most drastic procedure 
which should not be approved in the absence of express statu-
tory authority therefor. 
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By other provisions of the Insurance Code, a company may 
be summarily seized by the commissioner under an ex. parte 
order of the superior court based upon his verified applica-
tion therefor. Such an order continues in force until, after 
a full hearing, it appears to the court that the ground for it 
does not exist or has been removed. (Sec. 1012.) In other 
words, the company seized may challenge the grounds as-
serted by' the cominissioner as justifying his action, and, in 
the meantime, he is administering its affairs under the con-
dition that he must eventually establish by judicial decree, 
after hearing, his right so to do. 
During this time, particularly, his work should be accom-
panied with a minimum of inconvenience' to the company 
whose assets he is conserving. In organizations of any size 
there may be many thousands of policyholders and creditors. 
To allow him to summarily remove the company's office from 
the city where it has been carrying on its business for many 
years, and where he has a large administrative staff, seems 
to me to impose hardships which the legislature has not sanc-
tioned. 
Until 1935, the Liquidation Act (Stats. 1919, p. 268) au-
thorized the commissioner to remove the principal office of a 
company whose business he was administering "to the city 
and county of San Francisco." When the Insurance Code 
was enacted, the legislature made a requirement that the 
commissioner shall maintain an office in Los Angeles and 
added to the provision authorizing removal the words "or to 
the city of Los Angeles." To me, these changes indicate a 
legislative purpose to broaden his power of removal to in-
.clude the new office at Los Angeles, but I cannot read into 
them an intention to authorize the removal of an insurance 
company's office from San Francisco, where the commissioner 
also maintains an office, to IJos Angeles. 
For these reasons, I believe that the writs sought by the 
applicant should be denied. 
Rehearing denied. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing. 
.~ 
